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Abstract-  In  this  paper  we  focus  on  the  vertical  price 
transmission on the Hungarian milk market. We employ 
Gregory  –  Hansen  methodology  to  simultaneously 
search for a break point and a cointegrating relationship 
between the logs of producer and retail prices of milk.  
Price  transmission  is  asymmetric  on  both  long  and 
short-run,  and  after  November  2000,  the  marketing 
margin has increased.  We present a number of events 
that possibly explain the structural break. 
 
Keywords-  Price  transmission,  Gregory-Hansen 
cointegration, Hungarian milk market 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  The  question  of  price  transmission  in  the  agro-food 
industry has been the object of much research in the recent 
years (see Meyer and  von  Cramon-Taubadel, 2004, for a 
survey).  Within  all  the  products  under  scrutiny  the 
relationship between farm price and the retail prices of milk 
has received a great deal of attention in Europe as well as in 
the  USA  in  the  recent  years.  One  main  question  in  the 
debate  about  milk  price  relationships  concerns  whether 
retail milk price “responds” to changes in the farm price. 
This  question  assumes  that  a  relationship  between  these 
prices exists and is persistent over time. We know however 
that the milk market is quite complex, includes wholesaler 
and  intermediate  goods.  Moreover,  EU  countries  have 
benefit from the EU dairy policy including import quotas, 
export  subsidies,  domestic  production  and  consumption 
subsidies,  intervention  prices,  as  well  as  domestic 
production  quotas,  while  non-EU  countries  like  Hungary 
before  the  1st  of  May  2004  had  a  different  intervention 
policy.  Although  there  is  much  research  about  various 
aspects of this process, such as competitiveness, structural 
change,  etc,  analyses  focusing  on  agricultural  price 
transmission have attracted only scant resources. 
  Price  transmission  may  be  a  distinct  subject  for 
transition countries due to two reasons. First, because of the 
inherited pre-1989 distorted markets, low developed price-
discovery  mechanisms  and  often  ad-hoc  policy 
interventions, transitional economies could be expected to 
have  generally  larger  marketing  margins  and  more 
pronounced price transmission asymmetries. Second, when 
time series are relatively long some parameters may change 
over  time.  So  far  the  empirical  research  focusing  on 
structural  breaks  with  special  emphasis  on  long-run 
equilibrium  relationships  between  prices  at  two  different 
changes  of  a  supply  chain  is  limited  (e.g.  Dawson  and 
Tiffin, 2000; Dawson et al. 2006; Guilloteau et al. 2005). 
However,  we  may expect that in a  transition country the 
possibility  of  structural  breaks  may  be  larger  due  to 
profound structural changes along agri-food chains than in 
developed countries. 
  Given  the  high  level  of  interest  in  the  relationship 
among  prices  at  the  farm,  wholesale  and  retail  level,  for 
milk  we  propose  to  closely  examine  these  relationships 
using monthly time series data on these two levels using up-
to-date  cointegration  methods.  The  paper  is  organised  as 
follows.  Section  2  presents  the  Hungarian  milk  sector, 
followed by the applied methodology in section 3. Section 4 
focus  on  the  empirical  analysis,  and  finally,  section  5 
concludes. 
 
II. HUNGARIAN MILK SECTOR 
  At the end of eighties the state (21.1 %) and collective 
farms  (55.5  %)  dominated  milk  production  in  1989, 
respectively,  compared  to  23.4  by  private  farms.  The 
average herd sizes of the three main farm types were: state 
farms (1300 cows), collective farms (300 cows) and small 
holders  (1.4  cows).  However,  the  structure  of  dairy 
production  has  changed  considerably  during  the  last  15 
years.  The  number  of  cow  decreased  from  the  497 
thousands  head  in  1992  to  334  thousands  by  2005.  The 
number of dairy farms decreased between 1996 and 2005 
dramatically by 59 percent for private farms, the fall was 
modest for agricultural enterprises, 14 per cent. The average 
herd size by farm types illustrates unambiguously the dual 
production structure in Hungarian milk sector. Surprisingly, 
the  average  herd  size  decreased  from  326  to  295  in 
agricultural enterprises,  whilst it  grew  from 2.9 to 6.2 in 
private  farms  (Table  1).  In  2005,  agricultural  enterprises 
accounted for 67 per cent of output in terms of cow number, 
whilst the share of private farms was 33 per cent.  
The declining tendency of milking cows was not followed 
by  reduced  milk  production  because  of  increasing  yields. 
The  dairy  farm  structure  is  different  in  agricultural 
enterprises and private farms. 95 per cent of private farms 
have less than 10 cows, while 74 per cent of agricultural 
enterprises have more than 100 cows. 
The share of farms below 10 cows in herd stock is 71 per 
cent  for  private  farms  and  0.1  per  cent  for  agricultural 
enterprises. The emerging share of medium size dairy farms 
is only 13 per cent.  
Table 1.  Average cow herd size in Hungary 
Year  Private farms  Economic organisations  Total 
1996  2.9  326  9.4 
1997  3.6  331  10.1 
1998  3.9  359  11.1 
1999  4.3  353  11.5 
2000  3.5  308  10.9 
2001  4.3  320  11.8 
2002  4.4  324  12.8 
2003  4.9  298  14.3 
2004  4.5  295  12.5 
2005  6.2  295  18.2 
Source : Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) 
  In short, polarised structure of Hungarian dairy farms 
has not changed considerably during the analysed period. In 
Hungary  the  structure  of  milk  production  can  be  divided 
into  three  main  groups  differing  in  concentration, 
technology and in some respect in market segmentation as 
well: 
· The agricultural enterprises and a minority (3-7%) of 
the  private  farmers  mostly  keeping  more  than  100 
cows (300-600 on average) producing and selling to 
the processors. 
· Around 17-20% of the private farmers having 10-20-
30 cows trying to produce for the processors. 
· Finally,  most  of  the  private  farmers  (71%)  mainly 
having less than 10 cows. 
 
 
Figure 1 provides information about Hungarian dairy 
industry including the number of dairy processors, net sales, 
concentration ratio (the share of top five firms in total net 
sales and the role of FDI in owners’ equity. The net sales in 
nominal term show a continuous increase in the period 
under investigation. Since the data cover all firms with more 
than 20 employees, the number of firms have increased only 
slightly between 1993 and 1996, then decreased up to 2001 
and it stabilised at around 40. Other words, there is no an 
indication of market entry but rather firm growth. 
Simultaneously, the concentration processes had delayed in 
the Hungarian milk processing industry in the first half 
nineties. The CR5 index has increased significantly between 
1997 and 2000 reaching almost 60 percent levels. Jansik 
(2000) studying the foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Hungary, finds that industries characterised by a 
oligopolistic market structure (sugar, vegetable oil, tobacco, 
soft drinks, starch) were privatised in the early 1990s, 






Figure 1.  Evolution of total sales, number of firms, 
concentration and the role of FDI in owners equity in the 









































net sales firms CR5 FDI
Source: Research Institute for Agricultural Economics, Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office 
 
  Dairy  processing  is  one  of  the  four  largest  food 
industry,  accounting  for  over  12  per  cent  of  the  total 
Hungarian  food  processing  output.  The  privatisation  of 
dairy  industry  started  late,  in  the  mid  1990s,  and  was 
characterised by low FDI. However, in the second half of 
nineties  the  largest  dairy  firms  were  bought  by  foreign 
investors, resulting a high level role of FDI in Hungarian 
dairy industry.  
  Agricultural  subsidy  is  provided  through  a  system  of 
minimum prices, budgetary support, and border measures. 
The  Agricultural  Market  Regulation  Act  of  1993  directly 
regulates markets for wheat (for human consumption), feed 
maize, milk, live cattle and pigs for slaughter, by providing 
market price support via minimum guaranteed prices, paid 
up to a production quota limit, and government purchases in 
the case of market instability. Support to reduce farm input 
costs  includes  capital  grants  linked  to  interest  rate 
concessions to cover production cost, and reduction in the 
fuel tax and payments for irrigation development. Imports 
tariffs  and  export  subsidies  are  used  for  most  important 
agricultural  products.  Export  subsidies  constitute  an 
important,  albeit  declining,  policy  instrument  to  regulate 
crops and animal product market. Imports are regulated by 
ad valorem tariffs and tariff rate quotas.   
  Milk sector was supported by several ways. First, there 
is  an  indicative  price  system,  with  the  possibility  of 
intervention. If producers do not find a buyer, they may in theory sell their quality milk to the State at a guaranteed 
price that is lower than the indicative price. In recent years, 
market  prices  were  usually  higher  than  the  trigger  price; 
therefore  intervention  has  not  been  activated.  Individual 
dairy quotas  were introduced in 1996. Second, budgetary 
payments  based  on  output  include  mainly  quality  and 
intervention  payment.  Third,  area  and  headage  payments, 
they were HUF 20 000 (USD 77) per dairy cow in 2002. 
Fourth,  payments  based  on  input  use,  include  subsidised 
interest rate and guarantees for farm credit (around 45% of 
total), capital grants (15%) and fuel tax concessions (20%). 
Market price support had a predominant role in subsidizing 
milk sectors. Payments based on input use and on output 
had an increasing role, but their share was below 25 per cent 
of total support. 
  The  National  Land  Fund  was  amended  and  a  new 
institutional system was established to reassessment of land 
policy. The main amendments entail giving anyone who is 
renting farmland priority over family farmers for purchasing 
or  renting  arable  land.  The  duration  of  land  lease  for 
National Land Funds lands will decline from 50 to 20 years, 
while in the case of private persons this will increase from 
10 to 20 years. Land sales to foreigners and legal entities are 
prohibited.  Special  attention  and  support  is  given  to  the 
creation  and  development  of  producer  marketing 
organisations. Agricultural insurance is supported at a rate 
of 30 per cent of the fees charged. In the context of food 
safety,  new labelling rules are applied on dairy products, 
eggs, and most foods of vegetable origin entered into force 
as from April 2002. 
  According  to  the  Copenhagen  Agreement,  Hungary 
uses the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS). Hungarian 
farmers  in  2004  receive  305.81  million  EUR  direct 
payments.  The  calculation  of  the  milk  direct  payments 
because  of  CNDP  is  complicated.  According  to  the  CAP 
Reform adaptation agreement in the milk sector CDNP is 
even higher than in the other sectors of agriculture, in total 
it amounts to 60%. The 85% direct payment (25%-from the 
EU, 60%-from Hungary) with 1,947,280 tons of milk quota 
means 22.81 million EUR. From this amount the subsidy 
paid  according  to  the  SAPS  must  be  subtracted  which  is 
5.84 million EUR. The 16.97 million EUR left is divided by 
the quota the result is 8.71 EUR subsidies for a ton of milk. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Testing for unit roots 
  Most macroeconomic time series are not stationary over 
time, i.e. they contain unit roots. That is, their mean and 
variance are not constant over time. Utilising the standard 
classical estimation methods (OLS) and statistical inference 
can result in biased estimates and/or spurious regressions. 
There are a large number of unit root tests
1 available in the 
literature (see Maddala and Kim, 1998 for a comprehensive 
review). Maddala and Kim (1998) argue, that because of the 
size distortions and poor power problems associated  with 
the  commonly  used  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  unit  root 
tests,  it  is  preferable  to  use  the  DF-GLS  unit  root  test, 
derived  by  Elliott,  Rothenberg  and  Stock  (1996).  With 
structural breaks in the time series, the unit root tests might 
lead to the misleading conclusion of the presence of a unit 
root,  when  in  fact  the  series  are  stationary  with  a  break. 
Several  unit  root  tests  were  developed  to  handle  the 
problem. The Perron (1997) test performs an endogenous 
search for the breakpoints by computing the t-statistics for 
all  possible  breakpoints,  then  choosing  the  breakpoint 
selected  by  the  smallest  t-statistic,  that  being  the  least 
favourable one for the null hypothesis.  
B. Cointegration analysis 
  Even  though  many  individual  time  series  contain 
stochastic trends (i.e. they are not stationary at levels), many 
of them tend to move together over the long run, suggesting 
the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. Two or 
more  non-stationary  variables  are  cointegrated  if  there 
exists one or more linear combinations of the variables that 
are stationary. This implies that the stochastic trends of the 
variables  are  linked  over  time,  moving  towards  the  same 
long-term  equilibrium.  The  two  most  widely  used 
cointegration tests are the Engle-Granger two-step method 
(Engle  and  Granger,  1987)  and  Johansen’s  multivariate 
approach (Johansen, 1988).  
  Gregory and Hansen (1996) introduce a methodology to 
test for the null hypothesis of no-cointegration against the 
alternative of cointegration with structural breaks. 3 models 
are considered under the alternative. Model 2 with a change 
in the intercept: 
t t t t e y y + + + =
T
2 2 1 1 a j m m t  , t = 1,…,n.            (1) 
Model 3 is similar to model 2, only contains a time trend: 
t t t t e y t y + + + + =
T
2 2 1 1 a b j m m t  ,  t = 1,…,n.   (2) 
Finally,  model  4  allows  a  structural  change  both  in  the 





t t e y y y + + + + = t t j a a j m m 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 ,  
t= 1,…,n.                                                           (3) 
                                                 
1 Consider the first order autoregressive process, AR(1): 
yt = ryt-1 + et, t =…,-1,0,1,2,…,  where et is  white noise.
                                                                              
The process is considered stationary if  r < 1, thus testing 
for stationarity is equivalent with testing for unit roots (r= 
1).  Rewriting to obtain: 
Dyt = dyt-1 + et  where d = 1 - r, the test becomes:  
H0 : d = 0 against the alternative H1: d < 0. 
 Because usually the time of the break in not known a priori, 
models  (1)  –  (3)  are  estimated  recursively  allowing  T  to 
vary between the middle 70% of the sample: 
n T n 85 . 0 15 . 0 £ £                                                                      
For  each  possible  breakpoint,  the  ADF  statistics 
corresponding  to  the  residuals  of  models  (1)  –  (3)  are 
computed,  then  the  smallest  value  is  chosen  as  the  test 
statistic (being the most favourable for the rejection of the 
null). Critical values are non-standard, and are tabulated in 
Gregory and Hansen (1996).  
C. Asymmetrical error correction representation 
  With  the  development  of  cointegration  techniques, 
attempts  were  made  to  test  asymmetry  in  a  cointegration 
framework.  Von  Cramon-Taubadel  (1998)  demonstrated 
that  the  Wolffram-Houck  type  specifications  are 
fundamentally inconsistent with cointegration and proposed 
an error correction model of the form: 
 RPt























 RPt-j +γt                       (4) 
The error correction term, (ECTt), is in fact the residual of 
the long-run (cointegration) relationship: 
ECTt-1  =   t-1=  RPt-1  –  l0  –  l1FPt-1  ;  l0  and  l1  are 
coefficients.  The  error  correction  term  is  than  segmented 










t-1.     
                                 
Using a VECM representation as in (11), both the short-run 
and the long-run symmetry hypothesis can be tested, using 
standard  tests.  Valid  inference  requires  one  price  to  be 
weakly exogenous on both long and short run with respect 
to  the  parameters  in  (4).  Following  Boswijk  and  Urbain 
(1997) we test for the short-run exogeneity by estimating 
the marginal model (5), than perform a variable addition test 
of the fitted residuals ν
^





 = ψ0 + ψ1(L)  P
R
t-1 + ψ2(L)  P
P
t-1 + νt                     (5)                                                                                                                       
Long-run  exogeneity  is  tested  by  the  significance  of  the 
error correction terms in the equations (4), and (5). 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
  Milk producer and retail prices were collected from the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), from January 
1992  to  July  2007,  resulting  a  database  of  187  monthly 
observations for both time series. Prices were deflated to 
January 1992, using the Hungarian Consumer Price index 
(CPI),  than  logs  were  taken.  The  transformed  producer 
(FPM) and consumer (RPM) prices are presented on figure 
1.  
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Source: Own calculations using HCSO data 
 
DF-GLS, and Perron (1997) unit root tests
2 reveal that none 
of  the  price  series  is  stationary,  therefore  cointegration 
framework is needed to analyse the price series. Standard 
cointegration tests (Engle-Granger and Johansen) could not 
reject the no cointegration null. One reason might be that 
not  only  the  individual  series,  but  also  the  long-run 
relationship between them is also subject to level shifts.   
  The  Gregory-Hansen  (1996)  cointegration  test  in  the 
presence of level shifts
3, generated the recursively estimated 
ADF  statistics  in  figure  2.  The  minimum,  (-  5.951), 
corresponding to a structural break occurring in November 
2000,  is  significant  at  1%,  rejecting  the  no  cointegration 
null  in  favour  of  the  cointegration  with  regime  shift 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
2 Unit root test results are not presented here, but they are 
available from authors upon request. 
3 Lag length was selected by downward t-statistic chosen 
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Source: Own calculations using HCSO data 
 
The long-run relationship is (t- statistics in brackets): 
RPM = 2,344 + 0,184E + 0,332FPM    
                             (6) 














To test competitive market structure hypothesis, restrictions 
were  applied  to  equation  (6).    The  βRPM  =  -  βFPM 
homogeneity restriction was rejected, F(1,184) = 400.92, (p 
=  0.00).  It  follows,  that  Hungarian  milk  market  is 
characterised  by  mark-up  pricing,  with  an  elasticity  of 
transmission εFPM = 0.332.  
Exogeneity test results for producer prices are χ
2(1)
 = 0.326 
(p = 0.56), for retail prices are χ
2(1)
 = 15.695 (p = 0.00). It 
results, that producer prices are weakly exogenous, on the 
long-run,  producer  prices  determine  retail  prices.  After 
segmenting  the  error  correction  terms  resulted  from 
equation 6 onto positive and negative sections, a VECM 
model similar to equation 4 was estimated. Long and short-
run symmetry test results are presented in table 2: 
 
Table 2. Long and short-run symmetry tests on the 
Hungarian milk market 
Hypothesis  Long-run  Short-run 
































Test statistic  F(1,172) = 4.393 
(p = 0.03) 
F(1,172)  =  3.727  (p  = 
0.05) 
 
The  null  hypotheses  are  rejected,  it  results,  that  price 
transmission on the Hungarian milk market is asymmetrical 
on both long and short-run, i.e. the eventual producer price 
increases  are  transmitted  more  rapidly  and  fully  to  the 
consumer level than producer price decreases.  In addition, 
after  November  2000,  the  marketing  margin  increases 
(equation 6). What can be the reason for the increase of the 
marketing  margine?  Table  3  presents  data  from  GfK 
Hungaria Market Research Institute. In 2000, the volume of 
milk  and  milk  products  consumption  stagnated,  or  only 
slightly  increased,  whilst  the  value  of  consumption 
increased, supporting our results. 
Table 3. Changes of milk products consumption in 
Hungarian households. 
Product  Quantity   Value  
Milk  0   +16 % 
Cheese  +1 %  +18 % 
Fruit yoghurt   +8 %  +14 % 
Sour cream   -7 %  +10 % 
Source: GfK Hungária Market Research Institute ConsumerScan 
Note:  changes  in  January  –  September  2000,  related  to  January  – 
September 1999 
 
Figure  1  presents  the  situation  of  the  milk  processing 
industry during the analysed period. In 2000 the number of 
firms  decreased,  sales  however  increased,  and  thus  the 
market  share  of  the  5  largest  companies  increased.  It  is 
quite likely, that the bankruptcy in 2000 of one of the major 
milk  processing  firms,  MiZo,  also  contributed  to  the 
increased concentration, and the increasing market power of 
the  processing-retail  sectors.  This  explains  the 
asymmetrical price transmission in the sector. 
  The  polarised  production  structure  is  another 
explication for the asymmetrical transmission. 95% of the 
individual milk farms have less than 10 cows, whilst 74% 
of agricultural enterprises operating in the milk sector have 
more than 100 cows. According to the production structure, 
sales, technology and market share, Hungarian milk farms 
may be grouped into 3 categories: 
·  agricultural  production  companies,  and  a  small 
proportion of individual farms (3%), which have 
more than 100 cows (on average 300 – 600), and 
sell to processors; 
·  17 – 20% of individual farms, owning 10 to 30 
cows, and trying to sell for producers; 
·  71%  of  individual  milk  farms,  which  have  less 
than 10 cows. 
  Only  a  few  of  these  farmers  are  able  to  produce 
efficiently  large  quantities,  others  produce  for  self 
consumption or directly sell their products on local markets. 
 V. CONCLUSIONS 
  In this study we used Gregory-Hansen cointegration in 
the  presence  of  level  shift  methodology  to  analyse  the 
vertical price transmission between the producer and retail 
prices of milk in Hungary. We identified a structural break 
in  the  long-run  equilibrium  relationship  occurring  in 
November  2000,  after  which  the  marketing  margin 
increased. Major changes in the structure of Hungarian milk 
sector  explained  the  occurrence  of  the  structural  break. 
Price  transmission  analysis  revealed  that  transmission  on 
the Hungarian milk sector is asymmetric on both long and 
short-run. This is not surprising considering the production 
and  processing  structure  of  the  sector.  It  follows,  that 
processors  and  retailers  may  delay  or  not  fully  transmit 
producer  price  decreases  to  the  consumer  level,  thus 
reducing the efficiency of the sector. 
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